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Abstract 
This paper examines health insurance choice and its dynamics using panel data 
from Chile’s National Socio Economic Characterization Survey 1996-2001-2006. 
Evidence indicates that private insurance is losing customers to the public sector. 
Two different logistic models are used to explain the determinants of insurance 
choice as well as what drives the decision to move from the private to the public 
sector and vice versa. Income is a highly important determinant of choice, as well 
as age, education, geographical location and health status. Evidence of adverse 
selection against the public sector was found in both decision models. The results 
of this paper are in line with most of the previous investigations done on Chile’s 
health insurance system but it advance previous knowledge on the topic by 
including the dynamism and power for causal inference that panel data permits 
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“Better health is central to human happiness and well-being. It also makes an 
important contribution to economic progress, as healthy populations live 
longer, are more productive, and save more.” (WHO 2014) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Health shocks can be devastating to individual’s well-being. Aside from their 
deterioration in health, they can be affected by foregone income and the high–and possibly 
catastrophic–cost of health care services. All over the world, both private health insurance 
markets and national health systems have been developed to deal with the high cost and 
uncertainty associated with health care. Additionally, the focus on improving and protecting 
individuals’ health is an important development outcome, as it is also needed to reach higher 
levels of development. Thus different national health systems have developed to promote good 
health among their citizens by ensuring access and quality of health services.  
Since the 1980s healthcare reforms, Chile has relied on a universal and dual healthcare 
system consisting of both private and public insurance providers. Even though health care is 
universal and all citizens are insured against health shocks, this system is also characterized by 
its high level of income segmentation, and is plagued by problems due to market and government 
failures associated with its design and the widespread loose regulations of private insurance.  
 
Although this dual system provides an interesting setting in which to explore the existence of 
market and government failures linked to information asymmetries and lack of regulation, very 
few studies have been conducted in this area, and most of those that exist are over a decade old. 
All previous studies have relied on cross-sectional data, thus lacking exploration of what 
determines individuals to move from one type of provider to another. Understanding these 
dynamics and the causes of change could help shed light on this situation and explain some of 
inherent problems of the system.  
Using panel data to examine insurance choice and its dynamics over time, this chapter 
empirically investigates the main determinants of individuals’ choice of health insurance 
provider within the setting of Chile’s dual health insurance system. In addition, the study 
examines which factors bring about a change of individual affiliation from one insurance 
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provider type to the other. The results of this investigation will contribute to the literature by 
adding new evidence on the way a universal mixed health insurance system works, advancing 
previous knowledge on the topic through its inclusion of the dynamism and power for causal 
inference that panel data permits.   
The chapter is divided into seven sections. The following section will provide 
information about the history and main characteristics of the Chilean health system. Section III 
will discuss the theoretical framework behind information asymmetries and market failures, as 
well as the relevant literature on health insurance and Chile’s health system. Section IV will 
explain the data and provide some descriptive statistics. Section V and VI will explain the 
methodology and discuss the empirical results. Finally, the section VII presents main conclusions 
and policy implications. 
 
 
II. The Health System in Chile 
Since the early 1920s, the Chilean government has mandated that workers contribute a 
portion of their income to the national health system via compulsory worker’s insurance. 
Initially, healthcare was provided through a network of public hospitals and administered 
centrally. During the Pinochet government (1973-1990), the national healthcare system was 
reformed to allow the development of a private health sector in order to improve efficiency in 
health delivery and promote individual choice. Since the enactment of this decree number 3 in 
1981, the Chilean health system has changed dramatically, transforming into a universal yet dual 
system with both public and private health insurance options. Competition among providers was 
expected to improve the overall performance of the system. 
The health reform brought about the creation of new institutions called “Instituciones de 
Salud Privada” (ISAPRES), a private institution capable of providing both health insurance and 
health care. Decree number 3 permitted workers the choice of whether to make their mandatory 
health insurance contributions directly to the government insurance program, called “Fondo de 
Salud Pública” (FONASA), or toward the newly-created ISAPRES.2 Graph 1 illustrates the 
                                                
2 Coexisting with these two main insurance providers are the closed insurance schemes for the Armed Forces and 
private insurances for foreigners. These other insurance schemes represent only a small fraction of the insured 
population (Superintendencia de Salud 2014). 
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share of beneficiaries in each type of system from 1990 to 2012. Since the mid-1990s, FONASA 
has experienced a rise in total beneficiary participation, reaching 76% in 2012. Simultaneously, 
the percentage of the total population enrolled in both ISAPRES and other types of insurance has 
dropped significantly. 
 
Figure 4.1 Percentage of beneficiaries by insurance type. 
 
Source: Superintendencia de Salud (2014) 
 
 
The new legislation mandates that workers contribute 7% of their taxable income to 
health insurance, with a cap of approximately $250 US dollars per month. This contribution can 
be utilized to acquire insurance through FONASA or the ISAPRES system. FONASA affiliation 
entitles an individual to receive health care from public hospitals and public health providers at a 
co-pay level which depends exclusively on his or her income. Co-pays in the public sector range 
from 0% to 20% of a subsidized government set price on health care service (see Appendix 1). 
Individuals insured by FONASA can also receive health services from private providers, but at a 
much higher cost, since the reimbursement cap is based on government set prices, which are 
significantly lower than private sector ones. ISAPRES differs from FONASA by offering a much 
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wider range of insurance plans with different prices and benefits.3 Prices charged by ISAPRES 
are determined by individual risk factors and the level of desired benefits; individuals can 
purchase health plans with greater benefits by contributing more than the mandatory 7% of 
taxable income if desired.  
The idea behind the mixed system, and the subsequent creation of ISAPRES, was to 
foster market competition, thus promoting choice and improving efficiency while keeping 
universal coverage through mandatory contributions to the system. Theoretically, in a 
competitive system, individuals can move their resources from the public to the private sphere, 
as well as moving them within the private insurance market. ISAPRES contracts are lifetime 
agreements; however, individuals can opt out once every year or when they change jobs and 
ISAPRES can refuse coverage to new entrants. In principle, ISAPRES can only terminate 
contracts if the worker does not comply with payments, but there is evidence of their raising the 
cost of insurance in order to discourage riskier customers from enrolling or remaining enrolled. 
ISAPRES can unilaterally raise the price of the plans, arguing an increase in health costs. Even 
though this practice has been contested in court with positive results for the insured, the cases 
that go to court constitute a very low proportion of ISAPRES’ total portfolios (Paraje et al. 
2013). FONASA, on the other hand, is unable to exclude anyone from coverage. Public-sector 
insurance is required by law to provide health coverage to all individuals who want to enroll in 
the public system, regardless of their risk or health status. Thus FONASA serves as the ultimate 
safety net for those who cannot afford or are otherwise excluded from private insurance options. 
This feature enables private insurance providers to cherry-pick individuals or family 
groups with lower risks, leaving the public sector with riskier (and therefore more expensive) 
individuals –in essence, skimming the market and risk-dumping into the public sector. Moreover, 
as market concentration in the private sector has increased, the potential for competition between 
ISAPRES has decrees significantly over time. Both the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), 
which measures market concentration, and the C4 index, which reflects the market share, show 
that enrollment in the four largest ISAPRES plans has increased significantly since 2001 (Paraje 
et al. 2013); this is a reflection of takeovers and smaller ISAPRES being removed from the 
                                                
3 It has been estimated that ISAPRES currently offers over 12,000 different health plans (Paraje et al. 2013). 
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market.4 Additionally, there are several barriers to other insurance providers who wish to enter 
the market. Even if capital requirements do not present a major barrier, initial investment in 
advertising and sales force, and the lack of capacity to build long-term contracts with health 
providers that can compete with existing ISAPRES plans (which are vertically integrated with 
the major providers) discourage new entrants to the market (Agostini et al. 2011).  Although the 
law does not permit direct vertical integration between ISAPRES and health providers, these 
institutions have been able to integrate through grouped corporation structures, arguing that it is 
not the ISAPRE that controls the health provider but a different corporation. Vertical integration 
has increased significantly over the past decade; today there are 6 ISAPRES5, all of which are 
vertically integrated with health centers and hospitals around the country through different 
corporate structures (Tobar et al. 2012). 
In theory, the idea behind the 1980s health reform–to introduce competition between 
health insurance providers– was well intended. A market operating under a perfect competitive 
environment could lead to an efficient allocation of resources and the maximization of social 
outcomes. Unfortunately, in the case of Chile’s healthcare sector, both market and government 
failures are abundant. On the supply side, only few actors provide health insurance, limiting 
competition and choice. There are significant barriers to entry, restraining the capacity of new 
entrants that could foster competition, thus increasing social welfare through the creation of a 
less rent-extractive equilibrium. Similarly, on the demand side, the possibility of moving from 
one private provider to another is limited. Given the fact that ISAPRES can reject individuals 
based on their health risks or refuse to pay for health services derived from preexisting 
conditions, both the elderly and those suffering from chronic illness are significantly limited in 
their ability to move within the private sector. Once the enrolled participant (or a family member 
covered under their insurance plan) develops a chronic illness, or their health risks becomes too 
high, they must stay with their insurance provider, usually facing increased costs to keep same 
coverage.  Cid et al. (2009) estimates that 30% of ISAPRES beneficiaries are “captured” by their 
health insurance provider due to chronic illness or age, meaning they cannot move to another 
provider due to preexisting conditions. This evidences a very loose regulatory framework. 
                                                
4 The HHI rose from under 1,500 points in 1990 to above 2,000 points in 2011, and C4 rose from below 70% to 
almost 90% during the same period.    
5 ISAPRES can be divided in two groups: open and closed. Closed ISAPRES are linked to firms, and only 
individuals working in those firms can become members. These institutions represent less than 3% of the total pool 
of beneficiaries within the private insurance market.  
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As evidenced in the previous discussion, Chile’s market of mandatory health insurance is 
far from the perfect competitive market model. In addition to the supply- and demand-side 
problems, information asymmetries within the market foster moral hazard and/or adverse 
selection situations. These problems have been identified for decades as unavoidable features in 
health insurance markets (Arrow 1963), and therefore the importance of regulation to limit the 
negative effects of these asymmetries is paramount in this sector. The following section will 
discuss some of the problems caused by these information asymmetries from a theoretical point 
of view, as well as examine in depth the relevant empirical literature on which this study is built 
on and contributes to. 
 
 
III. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
In order to understand market failures, one must first comprehend how a perfect market 
works. The competitive market model and its equilibrium predict the maximization of social 
surplus and the efficient allocation of resources. There is no allocation of resources that would 
benefit society more than when marginal social costs equal marginal social benefits. Market 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient, meaning that there is no choice of quantity and price that could 
raise the benefits of one or more individuals without hurting the welfare of others.  
For the market to maximize social welfare and produce an efficient allocation of 
resources, a number of conditions must be met: (i) there are a large number of buyers and sellers, 
meaning no one can determine or influence prices; (ii) individuals and firms are rational, 
meaning they maximize their objectives (firms maximize profit and individuals maximize 
utility); (iii) factors of production have perfect or high mobility; (iv) there is full information 
availability and an absence of information asymmetries; (v) transaction costs are very low or 
nonexistent; (vi) there are no externalities, meaning the price mechanism is able to capture all 
social costs and benefits resulting from consumption and/or production; (vii) no entry or exit 
barriers exist; and (viii) the product is homogeneous in its characteristics. The level of market 
efficiency is determined by the existence or lack of these conditions. When one or more are 
missing, the market by itself will not be able to allocate resources efficiently, and the resulting 
equilibrium will not meet the Pareto criteria, leading to a negative effect on society’s welfare.   
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Depending on which one of the characteristics of the competitive market is missing, 
different market failures may arise, and therefore, different solutions can be proposed. In the case 
of health insurance markets, and particularly in the case of Chile’s health system, the market 
does not work exactly as predicted by the competitive framework, due to its institutional 
arrangements, information asymmetries. Additionally, health services by nature lead to positive 
externalities, or situations where the social benefit is higher than the private benefit (e.g. 
vaccines, preventive care services, clear air and water), justifying government intervention. This 
study discusses several aspects of market and government failure in Chile and focuses its 
empirical analysis on the existence of adverse selection, a problem that generates market 
segregation, fosters inequality, and could possibly jeopardize the sustainability of the entire 
system. 
In terms of information asymmetry problems, moral hazard is understood as a change in 
an agent’s risk-taking behavior after being insured –in other words, a post-contractual 
opportunism. Moral hazard arises when the insured do not face the complete social cost of their 
actions and insurance companies must bear a portion or all of the cost. Therefore, being insured 
could incentivize a change in behavior and create deadweight losses. In the case of health 
insurance, moral hazard is considered a special case of information asymmetry; agents know 
more about their own health status, behavior and health service demand than insurance 
companies. Individuals may use more than the optimal amount of health services when insured, 
as opposed to when they are not insured, due to the price after insurance being lower than the 
marginal benefit to them. Thus, given that they do not pay the full cost of health services, 
individuals covered by insurance have the incentive to over-consume them. Most insurance 
markets deal with this moral hazard by raising the premium and co-pays to control overuse.  
In his influential paper on health economics, Pauly (1968) develops the theoretical 
framework behind the moral hazard problem in health insurance. His paper illustrates the social 
losses produced by the overconsumption of health services that occurs because of lower prices 
for insured individuals. The article acknowledges the fact that demanding more health services is 
not “moral perfidy, but a rational economic behavior” (Pauly 1968, 535). Nyam (1999) revises 
Pauly’s (1968) article, arguing that Pauly overestimates welfare loss due to moral hazard.6 By 
incorporating the missing income effect into his analysis, Nyam (1999) shows how moral hazard 
                                                
6 See Appendix 3 for more details. 
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welfare loss might actually be lower, and could be offset by social gains such as risk-bearing, 
insurance companies’ ability to permit access to high-cost health care procedures and income 
transfers when individuals are sick. In order to reduce the moral hazard problem, Pauly (1968) 
proposes two solutions: deductibles and coinsurances. On one hand the deductible consists of a 
certain set amount of the health cost to be excluded from coverage; on the other, the coinsurance 
requires the insured individual to pay a percentage of the health service cost. These two devices 
increase the out-of-pocket cost of health care services for insured individuals, lowering the 
deadweight loss by decreasing overconsumption and excess demand. By increasing the cost, 
deductibles and coinsurances induce individuals to consume fewer health care services, leading 
to more efficient resource allocation. Another way to deal with moral hazard, in the tradition of 
policies used in the car insurance market and principal-agent theory, could be the use of 
incentives. Providing discounts or rewards to people who do not overuse their healthcare 
insurance and use preventive care services, could lead to a better allocation of resources. 
In the case of Chile, the capacity to control the moral hazard is limited in the public 
sector, since law forbids premium changes in FONASA. On the other hand, ISAPRES can adjust 
premiums and design their plans to minimize moral hazard by including co-pays and deductibles 
that can be adjusted over time. It must be noted that fee-for-service doctors are also affected by 
moral hazard. These doctors have an incentive to over-treat and over-prescribe medicines for 
their insured patients, usually in an attempt to cover themselves from lawsuits. Therefore, 
doctors’ moral hazard leads to inefficient resource allocation, adding to the moral hazard welfare 
loss that comes from insured individuals’ behavior. This particular type of moral hazard is 
prevalent in the Chilean system due to the vertical integration between ISAPRES and health 
providers. There are limited incentives to control costs, since in the end health corporations 
(insurance companies plus health care providers) can transfer the price to the individual over 
time, as well as limit his or her ability to move to another private insurance. This leaves the 
individual with no other option than staying at the same ISAPRE or moving to FONASA. 
The other information asymmetry problem relevant to the health insurance market is 
adverse selection–a pre-contractual information asymmetry. Adverse selection has been long 
studied both theoretically and empirically; Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) provide a theoretical 
model explaining adverse selection in health insurance. Since insurance companies do not have 
complete information about the potential risk of their customers, they need to disperse the risk 
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and create a pool of high- and low-risk individuals in order to balance their portfolio. However, 
from the demand side, high-risk individuals are always more keen to be in the pool and share 
risk, since the cost of insurance is based on the average risk pooled. It becomes increasingly 
unattractive for low-risk individuals to participate, and when they drop out, it creates an adverse 
selection problem–thus raising the cost of insurance. This equilibrium leads to market failures; 
under provision of insurance, higher costs could eventually cause insurance company 
bankruptcy.  
In the absence of the ability to charge risk premiums, the common solution to this adverse 
selection problem has been to provide universal coverage, or mandatory insurance. By creating 
mandatory insurance, the pool of risk would make the insurance scheme work, creating cross-
subsidies between healthier and younger individuals and the ill and the elderly. If everyone is 
insured, there is no selection bias, and therefore the risk is balanced; this lowers the incentive to 
leave the insurance company or take advantage of it. In some ways the Chilean health system is 
universal: everybody is covered. However, the characteristics of this dual system could be 
generating a large adverse selection problem for FONASA, where individuals with more serious 
health problems and thus more expensive treatments end up seeking coverage.  
ISAPRES, on the other hand, reduces adverse selection using market mechanisms. It 
offers different policies with different prices and coverage levels, allowing people who can 
afford it to self-select the high-cost coverage if they are riskier. This self-selection process 
provides information to the insurance companies by revealing individual preferences, thus 
decreasing information asymmetries. Nonetheless, this solution could create significant coverage 
gaps between those who have the resources to acquire high coverage for their high level of risk 
in the private market and those who do not. Individuals with a lower financial capacity will be 
left out, thus generating and/or sustaining social inequality.  
Several papers have studied health insurance choice in dual systems empirically. These 
studies both try to understand what drives the specific selection of insurance type and the 
possible problems associated with information asymmetries previously discussed. Cameron et al. 
(1988) proposed a microeconomic model for health insurance choice and the utilization of health 
care services. Using data from the Australian Health Survey (1977-1978), they conclude that 
individual health status has a greater impact on the demand for health care services than on the 
choice of insurance type, and income shows a higher relation to insurance choice than to health 
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care service use. They find evidence of moral hazard, due both to an increase in health services 
used when an individual is covered by insurance and an increase in services used when insurance 
companies are more generous in terms of coverage.  
Taking advantage of the national health insurance policy change in Australia, as well as 
the theoretical framework developed in Cameron et al. 1988, Cameron and Trivedi (1991) 
investigate the determinants of health insurance enrollment under two different policy settings in 
Australia. They first study the decision of getting extra coverage from 1977-1978 (using the 
1977-78 Health Survey). Because basic health insurance in Australia was mandatory, they were 
able to look at the determinants of incremental coverage. The second period studied was March 
1983 (using the March 1983 Health Insurance Survey), after mandatory insurance was abolished. 
The article found evidence that income is a significant determinant of whether an individual has 
incremental insurance as well as whether they have insurance in the second period.  Premium 
prices play an important role during the first period, mostly for middle-income families. Health 
risk factors appeared not to be significant in determining insurance choice in both periods, 
showing evidence against adverse selection. They did, however, find that sex and age were 
significant determinants of insurance coverage and insurance choice in both periods, reflecting 
different risk preferences. 
Few studies have analyzed the Chilean health system, and those that do exist generally 
rely upon data from the cross-sectional CASEN surveys from the 1990s period. Using the 
CASEN survey data from 1990 and 1994, Sapelli and Torche (1998) explore the individual 
variables that determine the choice between private and public health insurance. Their paper 
focuses on individuals who are mandated by law to acquire such insurance (including dependent 
workers and retirees). Using a logistic regression, the authors conclude that income has a positive 
impact on choosing private insurance over the public one, as do age, proximity to private 
healthcare facilities, and health status. In terms of adverse selection, the article finds that the 
information asymmetry regarding private information on health status generates an adverse 
selection against the ISAPRES, while observable information on health status, such as age and 
women in reproductive ages generates an adverse selection against FONASA. However, the 
adverse selection toward the private insurance disappears in the second period studied.  
Sanhueza and Ruiz-Tagle (2002) study the determinants of choosing private insurance 
using the CASEN 1996 data. By estimating simultaneous equations, they calculate the 
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probability of electing private insurance in the dual system. They find that the probability of 
having private health insurance increases with income as well as with the proximity of private 
providers. Other factors, like age of the household head, the existence of a constructed health risk 
index, and the percentage of females in the household, decrease the probability of having private 
insurance. Additionally, they show evidence that poorer health status increases the probability of 
having private insurance, evidencing adverse selection toward private insurance. Regarding 
moral hazard, the article finds a positive and significant correlation between the demand for 
health services and the probability of having private insurance, evidencing moral hazard against 
ISAPRES, meaning those who are insured by ISAPRES tend to demand more health services 
after being insured.  
Sapelli and Vial (2003), using 1996 CASEN data, examine the presence of adverse 
selection and moral hazard in the Chilean health insurance system through an analysis of 
dependent and independent workers’ choice of insurance and utilization of health services. In the 
context of dependent workers (workers with contracts) who are mandated to contribute to either 
the private or the public system, they analyze the relationship between health care services 
utilization and the choice of insurance provider. For independent workers (self employed), for 
whom there was no mandate, they analyze the relationship between the decision to purchase 
health insurance and the utilization of health services. The results show evidence of adverse 
selection against ISAPRES for independent workers, and against FONASA for dependent 
workers, based on observable characteristics of risk (e.g. age, pregnancy, number of children in 
the family, and number of women in fertile age in the family). In terms of moral hazard, they 
find no evidence of hospitalization overuse, but a positive and significant difference in doctor 
visits for those mandated to contribute. Dependent workers had more than double the number of 
doctor visits than those not contributing. 
Using the 2000 CASEN data, Henriquez (2006) shows that a “good” or “very good” self-
reported health status has a positive and significant effect on the probability of having private 
insurance, while having a health-related functional limitation has a negative and significant 
effect on the probability of having private insurance. Using a two-stage model to control for the 
endogeneity associated with the decision to have insurance, Henriquez (2006) shows evidence 
that having private insurance positively affects the use of ambulatory care services but not 
hospitalizations.   
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Previous studies on the determinants of health insurance choice in Chile and the issues of 
moral hazard and adverse selection in the system have based their analyses on cross sectional 
data; thus, they are unable to look at the role choice plays in change over time between these two 
types of insurance schemes. By using an updated dataset and the additional time variability that a 
panel survey provides, this study expands the existing literature on health insurance choice and 
the information asymmetry problems in the Chilean health insurance system. The empirical 
analyses will focus on the existence of adverse selection in the system. Since the survey follows 
individuals over time, this study can model participant choice as well as examine some of the 
characteristics that determine why people change from ISAPRES to FONASA or vice versa. The 
analysis of these dynamics could provide valuable information regarding the problems faced by 
the dual system in Chile, as well as serve as empirical evidence to drive health reform.  
 
 
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This chapter uses the three waves of the Panel CASEN survey 1996, 2001 and 2006. 
Same data set used in chapter 1 and 2. This data set contains information on health insurance 
affiliation as well as on individual characteristics and exposure to health shocks. Thus permitting 
the study of insurance choice as well as the determinants of movement from ISAPRES to 
FONASA and the other way around.    
Table 4.1 illustrates the percentage of individuals covered by each type of insurance for 
each wave of the survey. As seen here, there is a declining trend in ISAPRES beneficiaries: 
based on the panel data in 1996, 31% of the people were covered by ISAPRES, while 10 years 
later, that coverage had declined to 15%. Over time, ISAPRES could be losing significant 
prevalence among Chilean people (see also Appendix 2). 
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Table 4.1 Percentage of health insurance beneficiaries, by insurance type 
Health Insurance provider 1996 cross 
section 
1996 
panel 
2001 cross 
section 
2001 
panel 
2006 cross 
section 
2006 
panel 
ISAPRES 33.2 30.8 32.8 21.4 14.3 14.5 
FONASA 66.8 69.2 67.2 78.6 85.7 86.5 
Observations 17,839 8,943 12,957 9,283 12,726 8,984 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
Note: the additional panel respondents not presented in the table correspond to “other” types of insurance, such as 
defense forces insurance or insurance for foreigners. 
 
 
Table 4.2 provides insight on the distribution of health care insurance by age group. This 
table illustrates how older people and retirees (those over 65 years old) make up a large 
proportion of those with public insurance, indicating that as age increases, so does the probability 
of being insured by FONASA. In 1996, 9% of the elderly were covered by ISAPRES, a 
percentage that fell to 4% in 2001 and rose to 7% in 2006. If people are moving from the private 
to the public sector as they get older, this could indicate an adverse selection consequence of the 
mixed system. The reduction in income due to low pensions (low replacement rates) could also 
explain why, on average, older people are more prone to contribute to FONASA than ISAPRES.   
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Table 4.2 Distribution of health care insurance beneficiaries, by age group (in percentage) 
 1996 2001 2006 
14 years old and younger    
     ISAPRES 30.0 19.4 12.8 
     FONASA 70.0 80.6 87.2 
15 to 30 years old    
     ISAPRES 35.2 27.4 17.8 
     FONASA 64.8 62.6 82.2 
31 to 45 years old    
     ISAPRES 36.2 20.1 16.2 
     FONASA 63.8 79.9 83.8 
46 to 55 years old    
     ISAPRES 30.4 28.1 17.2 
     FONASA 69.6 71.9 82.8 
56 to 64 years old    
     ISAPRES 24.2 11.5 15.2 
     FONASA 75.8 88.5 84.8 
65 and Older    
     ISAPRES 9.3 4.7 7.5 
     FONASA 90.7 95.3 92.5 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
 
Table 4.3 indicates the distribution of health insurance by income quintile. Not 
surprisingly, poorer people are most often covered by FONASA, and wealthier people choose 
ISAPRES as their health insurance provider. Interestingly, this table also shows some of the 
dynamics of health insurance choice. Over the span of the decade covered by the survey, there 
was a decline in private insurance in all quintiles, including a significant decline in the 5th 
quintile.   
 
Table 4.3 Distribution of health care insurance, by income quintile (in percentages) 
Income 
Quintile 1996 2001 2006 
 ISAPRES FONASA ISAPRES FONASA ISAPRES FONASA 
I 2.6 97.4 4.6 95.4 3.4 96.6 
II 12.2 87.8 7.1 92.9 2.1 97.3 
III 23.3 76.7 9.6 90.4 5.8 94.3 
IV 31.3 68.7 17.7 82.3 10.0 90.0 
V 56.0 44.0 47.3 52.7 35.1 64.9 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
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In order to understand why these changes occurred, and to what extent they could 
represent an adverse selection toward FONASA, the next section will explain the methodology 
used to estimate insurance choice and the determinants of insurance dynamics.  
 
 
V. Empirical Analysis  
To better comprehend the main determinants of health insurance choice, a logistic 
regression on the dichotomous variable of health insurance (scored 1 if the individual chooses 
ISAPRE and 0 if they choose FONASA) is estimated. These logistic regressions are computed 
separately for each year. Then, based on the panel data and the literature on poverty dynamics  
(Zubizarreta 2005; Neilson et al. 2008 and Castro and Arzola, 2008), an analysis of transition 
matrices is provided to explore the variables that determine changes between insurance 
providers. This transition analysis has not been conducted previously for Chile, thus expanding 
what we know about insurance choice under the dual system. Two logistic regressions are 
estimated: one to evaluate the determinants of changing from ISAPRE to FONASA, and the 
other to evaluate the change from FONASA to ISAPRE. Estimations for both the 1996-2001 
period and the 2001-2006 period are conducted.  
Given the availability of variables in the data set, these models can test whether the initial 
choice and the subsequent change generate adverse selection by including health risk variables as 
well as controls. The specific variables included in the econometric models are: gender; age; 
whether one is a female at reproductive age; education; poverty; urban dummy; income; decrease 
in income between periods; poverty status (defined in relation to the national income poverty 
line); employment variables (employed, unemployed, ratio of employed adults to household 
size); number of children (those below 7 years old) living in the household; health shock 
experience in the past 5 years (a variable included in the 2001 and 2006 waves assigned a value 
of 1 if the individuals had experienced any high-cost health problem); precarious self-reported 
health status (a variable took the value of 1 if the individual reported having a bad or very bad 
health status on 5 point scale);  and a dummy that accounted for health disability.7  
                                                
7 The health disability dummy corresponds to having someone on the household with any of the following 
disabilities: eyesight, hearing and or speaking impediments, and psychological, mental or physical disability.  
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Coupled with the evidence presented in the descriptive statistics, which shows how 
unevenly distributed the population is between the two systems (where riskier individuals are 
more likely to be enrolled in FONASA), the inclusion of risk variables such as disability, health 
shocks, age, being a female of reproductive age, and self-reported health status in a multivariate 
analysis can provide evidence of adverse selection towards one type of insurance. This reinforces 
the evidence of the shortcomings within this type of dual-system institutional arrangement. If 
adverse selection towards FONASA occurred, then the experience of a health shock, poor health, 
or a disability would improve an individual’s chances of changing from private to public 
insurance, thus reducing his or her chances of choosing ISAPRE.  
 
 
VI. Results  
The insurance choice model presented in Table 4.4 provides the logistic regression results 
for each of the years studied. The probability of choosing ISAPRE is estimated for each year, in 
the context of the literature on health insurance choice, to understand the main variables that 
influence this choice. As expected, income plays an important role in determining choice (the 
higher the income, the higher the odds of choosing ISAPRE over FONASA); these results are 
statistically significant and consistent over all three years. Similarly, each year of education 
increases the odds of having insurance from ISAPRE over the odds of being enrolled in 
FONASA for all years.  On the other hand, as age increases (controlling for the rest of the 
variables), the odds of choosing ISAPRE lessen; this is a statistically significant and common 
result for all years. In contrast, unemployment decreased the odds of being insured by an 
ISAPRE in 1996 and 2001, but had no significant effect in 2006. Being employed increases the 
odds of being covered in the private sector for 1996 and 2001.  
In terms of the adverse selection variables, being a female of reproductive age decreases 
the odds of being insured by ISAPRE in 2001. Holding all other variables constant, the odds of 
choosing ISAPRE over FONASA for a female of reproductive age are only 56% of those odds 
for others. Having someone in the household with a health disability appears to be a statistically 
significant variable influencing choice in all years. Having a household member with any kind of 
disability decreases the odds of choosing ISAPRE over FONASA for all years. Being affected by 
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a negative health shock in the previous five years decreases the odds of being insured by and 
ISAPRE in 2006. Holding the rest of the variables constant, the odds of being in a private 
insurance scheme are 64% lower than being in FONASA for individuals that experienced a 
negative health shock.  However, this variable was not found to be driving choice in 2001. 
Finally, reporting a “bad” or “very bad” health status decreases the odds of choosing ISAPRE 
over FONASA. Those with poorer health have, respectively, 50% and 60% lesser odds of 
choosing ISAPRE over FONASA in 2001 and 2006. All these results provide evidence of 
adverse selection towards FONASA; it seems that those with higher health risks and conditions 
that require more (and probably more expensive) health care services choose are more likely to 
choose FONASA over ISAPRE. Younger, wealthier people choose ISAPRE over the public 
insurance scheme, thus evidencing issues of equity and a lack of risk pooling across the system.  
Some of the results in this study are in line with what previous research has found, higher 
income appears to be a significant determinant of choosing ISAPRES over FONASA. Similarly 
age and health risks factors are found to be positively correlated with the odds of choosing 
FONASA over ISAPRE (Sapelli and Vial (2003) and Henriquez 2006). However, this study 
found evidence of adverse selection against FONASA in contrast to the results reached by  
Sapelli and Torche (1998) study. They found evidence of adverse selection against ISAPRES. 
That said, one still needs to exercise caution when comparing results since methodologies and 
data used by studies tend to differ, and thus the new results could be driven by changes in the 
population and in the health system over time.  
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Table 4.4 Logit regressions estimates on health insurance choice for 1996, 2001 and 2006 
 Health 
Insurance 
Choice 1996 
 Health 
Insurance 
Choice 2001 
 Health 
Insurance 
Choice 2006 
 
Variables (Isapre=1, 
Fonasa=0) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(Isapre=1, 
Fonasa=0) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(Isapre=1, 
Fonasa=0) 
Odds   
Ratio 
       
Male dummy -0.052 0.95 -0.14 0.87 -0.04 0.96 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.28) (0.27) 
Female in reproductive agesa -0.16 0.86 -0.58** 0.56** -0.45 0.64 
 (0.31) (0.26) (0.29) (0.17) (0.35) (0.22) 
Age -0.03*** 0.97*** -0.04*** 0.96*** -0.02*** 0.98*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years of educ. 0.18*** 1.19*** 0.21*** 1.24*** 0.21*** 1.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Log per capita income 0.99*** 2.68*** 1.25*** 3.49*** 1.77*** 5.86*** 
 (0.22) (0.59) (0.17) (0.61) (0.19) (1.11) 
Income poorb -0.69** 0.50** 0.03 1.03 0.69 1.98 
 (0.29) (0.15) (0.35) (0.36) (0.48) (0.96) 
Disability dummy 1996 -1.01*** 0.37*** -0.87* 0.42* -0.70 0.50 
   (0.45) (0.19) (0.49) (0.24) 
Disability dummy 2001   -0.19 0.83 -1.21** 0.30** 
 (0.36) (0.13) (0.49) (0.14) (0.59) (0.18) 
Employed  0.32* 1.37* 0.43** 1.53** -0.11 0.89 
 (0.19) (0.26) (0.21) (0.32) (0.28) (0.25) 
Unemployed -1.77*** 0.17*** -1.08*** 0.34*** -0.46 0.63 
 (0.53) (0.09) (0.39) (0.13) (0.66) (0.41) 
# Empl. to HH size ratio -0.51 0.60 -1.02*** 0.36*** -0.96** 0.38** 
 (0.44) (0.26) (0.35) (0.13) (0.45) (0.17) 
Number of childrenc 0.07 1.07 -0.0003 1.00 0.13 1.13 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.26) (0.26) (0.35) (0.40) 
Heath shock 2001   0.21 1.23 0.41 1.50 
   (0.28) (0.35) (0.36) (0.54) 
Heath shock 2006     -0.44* 0.64* 
     (0.26) (0.17) 
Precarious self-reported health   -0.59** 0.55** -0.52* 0.60* 
   (0.23) (013) (0.29) (0.17) 
Urban 1.47*** 4.33*** 1.85*** 6.39*** 0.79*** 2.22*** 
 (0.24) (1.03) (0.30) (1.94) (0.27) (0.59) 
Constant -13.74***  -17.86***  -24.38***  
 (2.29)  (1.81)  (2.12)  
Pseudo R2 0.269  0.323  0.341  
Observations 5,922  7,074  7,125  
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations with cluster standard errors at the 
municipal level did not yield different results. 
a According to the WHO, women’s average reproductive age is considered to be between 15 and 35 years. This variable takes the 
value of 1 if a female is in that range and 0 otherwise. 
b Income poor corresponds to a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is classified as poor according to the 
national poverty line set by the government.  
c Number of children corresponds to the number of children below 7 years old in the household. 
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Table 4.5 shows the transition matrices: here we can see the percentages of those who 
change from FONASA to ISAPRES (and vice versa), as well as the percentage of people who 
stay with their initial insurance provider. The matrices show changes from the 1996-2001 period 
and the 2001- 2006 period. 40% of those insured by ISAPRES in 1996 changed to FONASA in 
2001, and only 4% made the opposite switch. For the period of 2001-2006, the results are 
similar: 40% of ISAPRES insurance holders changed to FONASA, while only 3% changed from 
FONASA to ISAPRES. Table 6 provides an overall view of individual change. From 1996 to 
2001, almost 85% of individuals did not change insurance providers, 12% changed from private 
insurance to public, and 3% switched from public to private insurance. For the 2001-2006 
period, 90% of respondents stayed with their initial insurance, 8% moved from ISAPRE to 
FONASA, and only 2% went to the private sector after being covered by FONASA in 2001. 
 
Table 4.5 Transition matrices for 1996-2001 and 2001-2006 periods 
Transition matrix I (1996-2001) 
 
2001 
ISAPRES FONASA 
1996 ISAPRES 60.0 40.0 
FONASA 4.0 96.0 
 
Transition matrix II (2001-2006) 
 
2006 
ISAPRES FONASA 
2001 ISAPRES 59.8 40.2 
FONASA 2.9 97.1 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
 
Table 4.6 Insurance dynamics, by percentage of people in each state 
 1996-2001 2001-2006 
Pub-Priv change 2.8 2.3 
Priv-Pub change 12.4 8.1 
Stayed in Public 66.2 77.5 
Stayed in Private 18.7 12.1 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
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The next set of tables takes into account those individuals who choose to move from one 
insurance type to the other (and particularly from ISAPRES to FONASA). Taking advantage of 
the longitudinal dimension of the data set, the following analysis estimates the determinants of 
change in insurance enrollment.  
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 display the results of a logistic regression of the decision of change 
during the 1996-2001 and the 2001-2006 periods, respectively. These regressions complement 
the previous results by providing information about the factors that could be determining why 
individuals choose to leave a certain insurance scheme and move to another. If those individuals 
that become riskier, or more expensive to insure and treat, are more likely to leave ISAPRES and 
become members of FONASA, this would add evidence confirming the hypothesis of adverse 
selection against the public sector. 
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Table 4.7 Logic regressions estimates on change of insurance provider (1996-2001)  
 
Variables 
 
Change from Fonasa 
to Isapre Odds Ratio 
Change from Isapre 
to Fonasa Odds Ratio 
     
Male dummy 0.29 1.33 0.38 1.46 
 (0.41) (0.55) (0.39) (0.57) 
Age  -0.04** 0.96** 0.03** 1.03** 
 (0.02) (0.22) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female in reproductive ages dummy 0.06 1.06 0.45 1.57 
 (0.51) (0.55) (0.47) (0.73) 
Years of educ. 0.18*** 0.19*** -0.15*** 0.85*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) 
Log per capita income 1.02*** 2.77*** -0.99*** 0.37*** 
 (0.36) (1.00) (0.22) (0.08) 
Income declined from 1996 to 2001a -0.24 0.79 -0.38 0.69 
 (0.39) (0.31) (0.29) (0.20) 
Income poor 1996 -0.70* 0.50* 0.31 1.36 
 (0.39) (0.20) (0.39) (0.54) 
Income poor 2001 -0.97 0.38 -0.83* 0.43 
 (0.66) (0.25) (0.44) (0.19) 
Disability dummy 1996 -0.09 0.91 -0.07 0.93 
 (0.67) (0.61) (0.56) (0.52) 
Disability dummy 2001 -0.75 0.47 0.20 1.22 
 (0.78) (0.37) (0.91) (1.11) 
Employed in 2001 0.96*** 2.60*** -0.17 0.84 
 (0.37) (0.95) (0.37) (0.31) 
Unemployed in 2001 -1.97* 0.14* 2.31*** 10.01*** 
 (1.11) (0.16) (0.81) (8.19) 
Loss of empl. from 1996 to 2001b 3.77*** 43.21*** -1.13 0.32 
 (1.37) (59.13) (0.92) (0.29) 
# Empl. to HH size ratio -0.07 0.93 0.87 2.38 
 (0.71) (0.66) (0.61) (1.46) 
Number of children 0.43 1.53 0.38 1.46 
 (0.39) (0.59) (0.42) (0.61) 
Heath shock 2001 0.99 2.69 -0.21 0.81 
 (0.69) (1.89) (0.31) (0.25) 
Precarious self-reported health -0.46 0.63 0.48 1.62 
 (0.62) (0.39) (0.32) (0.52) 
Urban 0.88* 2.42* -1.09* 0.33* 
 (0.51) (1.23) (0.59) (0.19) 
Constant -16.59***  12.42***  
 (3.71)  (2.42)  
Pseudo R2 0.306  0.175  
Observations 5,225 5,225 1,090 5,225 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations with cluster standard errors at the municipal 
level did not yield different results. 
a Income declined takes the value of 1 if the nominal income per capita of that individual decreased between the two periods, b 
Loss of employment takes the value of 1 if an individual was employed in the first period and unemployed during the following 
period.  
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Table 4.8 Logic regression estimates on change of insurance provider (2001-2006) 
Variables Change from Fonasa to Isapre Odds Ratio 
Change from Isapre 
to Fonasa Odds Ratio 
     
Male dummy -0.34 0.71 -0.25 0.78 
 (0.48) (0.34) (0.43) (0.34) 
Age  -0.02* 0.98* 0.01 1.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female in reproductive ages dummy -0.58 0.56 0.83 2.30 
 (0.59) (0.33) (0.61) (1.41) 
Years of educ. 0.18** 1.19*** -0.17*** 0.84*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.23) 
Log per capita income 1.06*** 2.89*** -1.47*** 0.23*** 
 (0.32) (0.93) (0.34) (0.08) 
Income declined from 2001 to 1996 0.79** 2.20** -0.85** 0.43** 
 (0.39) (0.86) (0.34) (0.15) 
Income poor 1996 -0.41 0.66 1.60*** 4.93*** 
 (0.39) (0.26) (0.47) (2.33) 
Income poor 2001 -0.87 0.42 0.01 1.01 
 (0.55) (0.23) (0.57) (0.57) 
Income poor 2006 1.09* 2.97* -0.38 0.68 
 (0.62) (1.83) (0.99) (0.68) 
Disability dummy 1996 -0.29 0.74 0.42 1.52 
 (0.69) (0.51) (0.88) (1.33) 
Disability dummy 2001 0.46 1.58 2.46*** 11.75*** 
 (0.78) (1.23) (0.66) (7.72) 
Employed in 2006 0.41 1.50 1.61*** 5.00*** 
 (0.57) (0.86) (0.49) (2.44) 
Unemployed in 2006 -0.64 0.53 -1.02 0.36 
 (1.08) (0.57) (1.18) (0.43) 
Loss of empl. from 2001 to 2006 -1.88 0.15 2.92* 18.06* 
 (1.51) (0.23) (1.50) (27.89) 
# Empl. to HH size ratio -0.32 0.73 0.42 1.52 
 (0.92) (0.67) (0.68) (1.03) 
Number of children -0.79 0.46 -0.53 0.59 
 (0.59) (0.27) (0.35) (0.21) 
Heath shock 2001 -0.33 0.72 -0.96 0.38 
 (0.45) (0.32) (0.60) (0.23) 
Heath shock 2006 -0.29 0.74 -0.09 0.92 
 (0.46) (0.34) (0.32) (0.3) 
Precarious self-reported health 01 -0.045 0.96 1.49*** 4.45*** 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.53) (2.37) 
Precarious self-reported health 06 -0.62 0.54 0.45 1.57 
 (0.54) (0.29) (0.49) (0.77) 
Urban 0.36 1.43 1.74** 5.70** 
 (0.42) (0.60) (0.78) (4.44) 
Constant -16.87***  16.79***  
 (3.68)  (4.09)  
Pseudo R2 0.183  0.245  
Observations 5,903 5,903 669 669 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006 panel data. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations with cluster standard errors at the municipal 
level did not yield different results. 
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Table 4.7 presents the results of the 1996-2001 change model. As expected, income and 
education appear to be positive and significant determinants of the probability of changing from 
public to private insurance; in other words, the higher the income, the higher the odds of 
changing from FONASA to ISAPRES. People living in urban areas are more likely to change 
from private to public insurance, and less likely to move in the opposite direction. Employment 
variables show the anticipated signs: being employed increases the odds of moving from the 
public insurance to a private scheme, and being unemployed decreases those odds. A strong 
trend is also found among the unemployed insured in the public sector. Holding other variables 
constant, the unemployed have 10-to-1 odds of moving from ISAPRE to FONASA. Contrary to 
what is expected, being unemployed in 2001 after being employed in 1996 (a proxy for an 
individual’s losing their job over this period) increases the odds of moving from FONASA to 
ISAPRE. A possible explanation of this unexpected result could be that individuals in that 
position become dependent beneficiaries of ISAPRE through someone else, given that they are 
unemployed. It should also be taken into account that a five-year period might be too long to 
gauge the effects of a transition from employment to unemployment. In terms of the variables 
related to higher cost of health care (age, gender, reproductive age, disability, health shock, and 
self-reported health status), only age was found to be a statistically significant driver of change 
between 1996 and 2001; the others were found to be not statistically significant. These results 
could be driven by the fact that individuals with higher health risks or higher health-service costs 
self-selected into a particular insurance plan in 1996, and thus their changes are not captured in 
the analysis.   
Table 4.8 presents the results of the change decision logistic regression for the period of 
2001-2006. Some results appear similar to those found in the previous period; however, some 
important differences are worth mentioning. Higher levels of education and income increase the 
odds of moving from public to private insurance and decrease the odds of leaving an ISAPRE. 
Experiencing an income loss (defined as having a lower income per capita than in the previous 
period covered by the survey) increases the odds of moving from FONASA to ISAPRE, and 
decreases the odds of moving in the other direction. A possible explanation could be that a 
change in job, which requires revisiting health insurance affiliation, combined with the efforts of 
ISAPRE’s sales force, may have an effect on an individual’s decision to switch to ISAPRE. 
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Employment variables have the expected signs, but only the employment dummy variable has a 
positive and significant effect on the likelihood of moving from FONASA to ISAPRE. Contrary 
to the previous period, between 2001 and 2006 being employed and then unemployed increases 
the likelihood of leaving the private sector and getting insured by FONASA. 
In terms of adverse selection evidence, several variables in this model imply that between 
2001 and 2006 FONASA received individuals who were more “liable” or more “expensive” to 
care for. Living in a household where there is a person with a disability increases the odds of 
leaving ISAPRE and moving to FONASA; individuals in that situation had 12-to-1 odds of 
moving to FONASA compared to those living in a disability-free household. Similar results 
occurred in the case of self-reported health status; those who reported poor health showed higher 
odds of moving to FONASA that those with better health (4.5-to-1 odds). Having experienced a 
health shock does not appear to drive the decision to change from one system to the other.  
Overall, the results of the 2001-2006 change decision model suggest some adverse 
selection against public-sector insurance. Older individuals and those with worse health 
conditions are more likely to move from the private insurance system to the public one, thus 
putting pressure on and eventually increasing the costs of FONASA.  
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
Individual health is a world of uncertainty and risk. Health shocks can be disruptive to 
individuals and families in both social and economic terms. General insurance markets have 
developed to diffuse risk and help with smoothing consumption rates. Individuals acquire 
insurance in order to spread out the cost of potential future catastrophes and cope with shocks. 
Additionally, depending on their design, health insurance systems can reduce the price of 
procuring preventive care, which can lessen the probability of health issues later on. 
Governments have vested interests in the well-being of their citizens, particularly their 
health, given that health is central to human development and that healthier populations are more 
economically productive. This knowledge has driven the creation and utilization of different 
schemes of health insurance around the world, ranging from the purely private (e.g. Netherlands 
and Switzerland) to universal public health (as in Canada or United Kingdom). Depending on the 
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country and its institutional health system arrangements, regulations are put in place to control 
adverse selection and moral hazard; however, evidence has shown repeatedly that the insurance 
market still fails particular with respect to public insurance sector, leading to a asymmetric 
distribution of health risks and health costs. There is still need for further empirical research to 
find the scheme that can most efficiently minimize social losses. 
Using panel data from Chile’s National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey 1996-
2001-2006, this study examines health insurance choice and its dynamics over a ten-year time 
period. Between 1996 and 2006, many people changed their insurance providers, revealing a 
common trend: private insurance appears to be losing the sickest customers to the public sector.  
 
The results of the logistic regressions for yearly choices are evidence of the determinants 
of insurance selection. Income and education seem to be highly important in determining the 
choice; higher income and more years of education increase the odds of choosing private 
insurance. Age, health disability, and the experience of a health shock (for 2006) are associated 
with an increase in the likelihood of choosing FONASA over ISAPRE. These results are 
evidence of adverse selection toward the public sector. Additional evidence of this phenomenon 
can be extracted from the decision to change insurance models. Older individuals, and those with 
worse health conditions, are more likely to leave ISAPRE and move to FONASA. This trend is 
motivated by the fact that FONASA cannot reject any beneficiary nor adjust their prices to 
account for risk or health care costs.  
The results of this research are aligned with those in previous studies done on Chile’s 
health insurance system, and advance the knowledge that explains why people change insurance 
providers over time. Because the results make use of data on changes over time, they serve to 
strengthen claims about the existence and causes of adverse selection toward public provision in 
the case of health insurance, and thus could add to the base of knowledge used to drive health 
reform in Chile. Unfortunately, given data limitations, moral hazard cannot be analyzed in detail 
here. Future research should try to address moral hazard questions alongside adverse selection 
issues, using panel data sets as a way to better understand the potential problems that can arise 
within a universal but dual system. 
Chile is currently undergoing several reforms aimed at tackling social inequality. A large 
tax reform was recently passed by Congress, allowing the public sector to invest more resources 
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in education and health, however, if these efforts are not made in conjunction with institutional 
reforms, such as better regulation over private health insurance companies, eventually resources 
will not be enough to treat those with public-sector insurance. In order to minimize these 
problems, health reform could start by not allowing ISAPRES to price discriminate and forcing 
them to provide more transparent information and clearer health plans. ISAPRES could be 
mandated to offer a universal health plan covering high-cost treatments and preventive care. 
Additional elective coverage could be made available as a way to continue to prioritize 
individual choice and minimize the sense of excessive government intervention over private 
decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper – November 2014 
References 
Aday, Lu Ann, and Ronald Andersen. 1974. “A Framework for the Study of Access to Medical 
Care.” Health Service Research 9 (3): 208-220. 
 
Agostini, Claudio, Eduardo Saavedra and Manuel Willington. 2011. "Collusion on Private 
Health Insurance Coverage in Chile.” Journal of Competition Law and Economics 7(1): 205-40. 
 
Annick, Manuel. 2002. “The Chilean Health System: 20 Years of Reform.” Salud Pública de 
México 44 (1): 60-68.  
 
Bhattacharya, Jay, and Neeraj Sood. 2007. “Health insurance and the obesity externality. Vol. 
17. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Bendezú, Luis, Angela Denis, Carmen L. Sánchez, Pamela Ugalde and José R. Zubizarreta. 
2007. “La encuesta panel CASEN: metodología y calidad de los datos. Versión 1.0.” 
Observatorio Social Universidad Alberto Hurtado. 
 
Brown, Jeffery and Amy Finkelstein. 2007. “Why Is the Market for Long Term Care Insurance 
so Small?” Journal of Public Economics 91(10): 1967–91 
	  
Cameron, Colin, and Pravin Trivedi. 1991. “The Role of Income and Health Risk in Choice of 
Health Insurance: Evidence from Australia.” Journal of Public Economics 45 (1): 1-28. 
 
Cameron, Colin, Pravin Trivedi, Frank Milne, and John Piggott. 1988. “A Microeconomic Model 
of Demand for Health Care and Health Care Insurance in Australia.” Review of Economic 
Studies 55(1): 85-106. 
 
Castro, Rodrigo, and María Elena Arzola. 2008. "Determinantes de la Movilidad de la Pobreza 
en Chile (1996-2006)." Serie Informe Social 112. Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo. Santiago, 
Chile.  
 
Cid, Camilo, Eduardo Salazar, Roberto Tegtmeier and Alberto Muñoz. 2009. "Magnitud y 
Características de la Cautividad en el Sistema Isapre," Chile: Superintendencia de Salud. 
 
Einav, Liran and Amy Finkelstein. 2011. “Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics 
in Pictures.” Journal of Economics Perspectives 25(1): 115-138. 
 
Fang, Hanming, Michael P. Keane and Dan Silverman. 2008. “Sources of Advantageous 
Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market.” Journal of Political Economy, 
University of Chicago Press 116(2): 303-350. 
 
Feldstein, Martin S. 1973. “The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance.” The Journal of 
Political Economy 81(1): 251-280 
 
Finkelstein, Amy and Kathleen McGarry. 2006. “Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: 
Working Paper – November 2014 
Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.” American Economic Review 96(4): 938–
58 
 
García, Luis. 1999. "Seguros de salud públicos y privados: el caso chileno," Documentos de 
Trabajo 172, Departamento de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan. 2005. Public Finance and Public Policy. Worth Publishers.   
 
Guiñez, Paulina and Bozidar Calderón. 2002. “Determinantes de la Elección Entre Sistemas de 
Salud en Chile: Años 1996 y 2000.” Universidad de Concepción, Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas y Administrativas, Departamento de Economía.  
 
Neilson, Christopher, Dante Contreras, Ryan Cooper and Jorge Hermann. 2008. “The Dynamics 
of poverty in Chile.” Journal of Latin American Studies 40 (2): 251–273. 
 
Newhouse, Joseph. 2002. Pricing the Priceless: A Health Care Conundrum. MIT Press. 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Nyman, John A. 1999. “The economics of Moral Hazard revisited.” Journal of Health 
Economics 18(6): 811-824 
 
Observatorio Social, Unversidad Alberto Hurtado. 2007. “La encuesta Panel CASEN: Manual de 
Usuario”. Available at: 
http://www.dev-out.cl/sites/default/files/Manual_del_Usuario_-_V_2.0.pdf    
 
Paraje,	  Guillermo,	  Eduardo	  Bitran,	  Fabian	  Duarte	  and	  Manuel	  Willington.	  2013.	  “El	  mercado	  de	  
los	  seguros	  privados	  obligatorios	  de	  salud:	  Diagnóstico	  y	  reforma”	  Documento	  de	  Referencia	  11,	  
Espacio	  Público.	  Santiago,	  Chile.	  
 
Pauly, Mark. 1968. “The economics of Moral Hazard: Comments.” American Economic Review 
Vol. 58(3): 531-537 
Rothschild, Michael and Stiglitz, Joseph. 1976. “Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: 
an essay on the economics of imperfect information.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4): 
629–649. 
 
Sanhueza, Ricardo, and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle. 2002. “Choosing Health Insurance in a Dual Health 
Care System: The Chilean Case.” Journal of Applied Economics 5(1): 157-184.  
 
Sapelli, Claudio, and Arístides Torche. 1998. “El Seguro de Salud: Determinantes de la Elección 
Entre Seguro Público y Privado, 1990 -1994.” Cuadernos de Economía 106: 383-406.  
 
Sapelli, Claudio, and Bernardita Vial. 2003. “Self-Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health 
Insurance.” Journal of Health Economics 22(3): 459-476.  
 
Working Paper – November 2014 
Tobar, Javier, Soledad Cabrera, Paula Núñez, Carlos Vasallo, José Luís Guerrero and Mauricio 
Ríos. 2012.  “Mercado de la Salud Privada en Chile.” Study Requested by the Fiscalia Nacional 
Económica. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.  
 
Vergara, Marcos. 2007. “Equidad en el Acceso a la Salud en Chile.” Revista Chilena de Salud 
Pública 11(3):150-157. 
 
World Health Organization (WHO). 2000. The World Health Report 2000 – Health systems: 
improving performance. World Health Organization  
 
World Health Organization (WHO). 2014. “Health and Development” accessed October 10, 
2014. http://www.who.int/hdp/en/   
 
Zubizarreta, José. 2005. “Dinámica de la pobreza: el caso de Chile 1996-2001.” Unpublished 
Memoria para optar al título de Ingeniero Civil de Industrias, con Diploma en Ingeniería 
Matemática, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. 
 
World Health Organization (2014) “Health and Development” http://www.who.int/hdp/en/  
accessed October 10, 2014. 
 
Zubizarreta, José Ramón (2005) “Dinámica de la Pobreza: El Caso de Chile 1996-2001.” 
Memoria para optar al título de Ingeniero Civil de Industrias, con Diploma en Ingeniería 
Matemática Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper – November 2014 
Annex 1. FONASA Bracket scheme, copays by beneficiary categories. 
 
Bracket Beneficiaries Copay Percentage 
A 
-­‐ Extreme poor.  -­‐ Beneficiaries of basic solidary pensions. -­‐ Beneficiaries of family subsidy (Subsidio Único 
Familiar, SUF)  
0% 
B Individuals with a monthly taxable income of $210,001 or less.  0% 
C 
Individuals with a monthly taxable income between 
$210.001 and $306,000. 
Note: With 3 or more dependents they would move to 
group B. 
10% 
D 
Individuals with a monthly taxable income higher than 
$306,001.  
Note: With 3 or more dependents they would move to 
group C. 
20% 
Source: Superintendencia de Salud 
Note: Monetary figures are expressed in Chilean pesos ($550 Chilean pesos to a dollar approximately).  
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Annex 2. Statistics of Health Insurance Beneficiaries (1996-2012) 
Year 
Public 
insurance, 
FONASA 
Participation 
of public 
insurance, 
FONASA 
Private 
insurance 
ISAPRE 
Participation 
of ISAPRES 
Other 
providers 
Participation 
in Other 
providers  
Total 
population 
1996 8,672,619 59.01% 3,813,384 25.95% 2,209,787 15.04% 14,695,790 
1997 8,753,407 58.76% 3,882,572 26.06% 2,260,383 15.17% 14,896,362 
1998 9,137,599 60.53% 3,679,835 24.37% 2,279,496 15.10% 15,096,930 
1999 9,403,455 61.47% 3,323,373 21.72% 2,570,671 16.80% 15,297,499 
2000 10,157,686 65.60% 3,092,195 19.97% 2,234,851 14.43% 15,484,732 
2001 10,156,364 64.86% 2,940,795 18.78% 2,561,472 16.36% 15,658,631 
2002 10,327,218 65.23% 2,828,228 17.86% 2,677,085 16.91% 15,832,531 
2003 10,580,090 66.10% 2,729,088 17.05% 2,697,251 16.85% 16,006,429 
2004 10,910,702 67.43% 2,678,432 16.55% 2,591,194 16.01% 16,180,328 
2005 11,120,094 68.01% 2,660,338 16.27% 2,569,544 15.72% 16,349,976 
2006 11,479,384 69.51% 2,684,554 16.25% 2,351,436 14.24% 16,515,374 
2007 11,740,688 70.38% 2,776,912 16.65% 2,163,172 12.97% 16,680,772 
2008 12,248,257 72.71% 2,780,396 16.50% 1,817,519 10.79% 16,846,172 
2009 12,504,226 73.50% 2,776,572 16.32% 1,730,776 10.17% 17,011,574 
2010 12,731,506 74.14% 2,825,618 16.46% 1,614,239 9.40% 17,171,363 
2011 13,202,753 76.20% 2,925,973 16.89% 1,196,814 6.91% 17,325,540 
2012 13,377,082 76.53% 3,064,076 17.53% 1,038,565 5.94% 17,479,723 
Source: Superintendecia de Salud 2014. 
Note: Other providers correspond to Private insurance for foreigners, Insurance schemes for Police and Armed 
forces.  
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Total number of ISAPRE beneficiaries 
 
Source: Superintendencia de Salud 2014. 
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Annex 3. The effect of adverse selection and moral hazard on social welfare  
The market of insurance, particularly health insurance, is characterized by the presence of 
information asymmetries, causing two undesirable situations: moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Both situations, through different mechanisms, lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources generating a negative effect on social welfare.  
 
The first situation, moral hazard, occurs when insured individuals access health services at a 
lower price than the marginal social cost, they tend to over consume imposing large costs on 
society. Since the opportunity cost of those resources is higher than the price paid for them, a 
non-efficient resource allocation results.  Figure 1 shows the deadweight loss due to moral 
hazard when individuals are covered by health insurance. The price with insurance is lower than 
the social marginal cost, therefore individuals maximizes their utility when their private marginal 
cost is equal to their marginal benefit (demand curve), making the individual over consume 
health services in the amount of Q2 - Q1. The difference between the private cost and the social 
cost times the overconsumption is the total deadweight loss produced by the moral hazard.   
 
Figure A3-1. 
 
Source: Adapted from Gruber (2005) p.406 
 
 
In the case of adverse selection, social loses are created due to under provision of health 
insurance. Figure 2, adapted from Einav and Finklestein (2011), provides a “textbook” setting of 
adverse selection based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) article. The demand for health 
insurance is determined by the expected costs of healthcare and risk premium for each 
individual, where willingness to pay for insurance is positively related to risk. The marginal cost 
curve is downward sloping due to the expected costs and willingness to pay relationship (riskier 
or sicker individuals are willing to pay more for insurance than their healthier counterparts). In 
this selection market setting the demand curve and the cost curve are directly related due to 
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adverse selection. Costs of health insurance are influenced by the health risk of individuals that 
at the same time are driving the demand curve.  
The efficient allocation of resources in a competitive market is determined when marginal cost 
equals demand or marginal benefit. In the case of health insurance and adverse selection the 
equilibrium is reached when average cost is equal to the demand. Since the average cost is 
always above the marginal cost (due to the adverse selection), the equilibrium does not maximize 
social welfare but creates a deadweight loss represented by ABCD.  
 
Figure A3-2. 
Source: Adapted from Einav and Finklestein (2011) 
 
In this case the demand curve is always above the marginal cost, therefore the social maximizing 
quantity of health insurance should be Qmax, however, the health insurance market in presence of 
adverse selection yields an equilibrium quantity of Q*, where average cost meets the demand 
curve. The market equilibrium in presence of adverse selection, leaves out all individuals 
between Q* and Qmax, generating an inefficient resource allocation. Individuals left out do value 
the insurance above its marginal social cost but below the average cost.  
 
The above theoretical analysis is based on the assumption that all individuals are risk-averse, and 
differ only in their privately known probability of incurring in health costs and that there are no 
transactions costs. There is theoretical research, as well as empirical research, which estimates 
the existence and size of adverse selection insurance markets where administrative costs and 
heterogeneity of preferences are taken into account (see Brown & Finkelstein 2007, Newhouse 
2002, Fang et al. 2008 and Finkelstey & McGarry 2006; Bhattacharaya 2007). 
Working Paper – November 2014 
For further discussion of markets in the presence of adverse selection see Einav and Finklestein 
(2011) who provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis and discuss some of the empirical 
evidence of previous literature on different scenarios that depart from the simple model 
presented above. 
 
 
